

FIXING THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES  
MARINE CORPS, ADDING THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE  
CORPS AS A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

JUNE 30, 1951.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State  
of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. VINSON, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the  
following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 677]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill  
(S. 677) to fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine  
Corps, and to establish the relationship of the Commandant of the  
Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having considered the same,  
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the  
bill as amended do pass.

The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

That the following is hereby substituted for the first sentence of section 206 (c)  
of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 501):

"(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy  
as defined in this section, shall include not less than four full-strength combat  
divisions, four full-strength air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and  
other services as may be organic thereto. Hereafter the actual enlisted strength  
of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps shall be not less than three hundred  
thousand. The total active duty enlisted strength of the Marine Corps shall  
not be more than four hundred thousand, which number shall constitute the  
authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps:  
*Provided*, That this limitation shall be suspended during time of war or national  
emergency declared by the Congress. The actual permanent commissioned  
strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps, exclusive of commissioned  
warrant officers, shall not be less than 4 per centum and not more than 7 per  
centum of the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine  
Corps. 'Actual strength,' as used in this subsection, shall be construed to mean  
the daily average number of personnel in the category concerned during the  
fiscal year and shall be attained as soon as practicable without impairing the  
efficiency of the Marine Corps but not later than twenty-four months after the  
date of enactment of this amendatory Act."

SEC. 2. Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505) as  
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."

SEC. 3. Section 2 (b) of the Act of April 18, 1946 (60 Stat. 92), is hereby repealed.

Amend the title to read as follows:

A bill to fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine Corps, to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for other purposes.

#### PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of the proposed legislation, as amended by the committee, is twofold: First, to require the maintenance of a versatile expeditionary force in readiness, always combat ready, which will include four full-strength Marine divisions, four full-strength Marine air wings, and other forces organic thereto; second, to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to broaden the base of planning and deliberations of that body, as well as to provide the Marine Corps with needed direct representation at this level.

#### STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS

As passed by the Senate, the proposed legislation provided a ceiling on the strength of the Marine Corps in the amount of 400,000. There was no floor, however, except insofar as a floor was indicated by the specification in the Senate bill that the Marine Corps would include four full-strength divisions and four full-strength air wings.

The bill, as amended by the House committee, specifies not only the Senate-proposed ceiling of 400,000 on the active-duty strength of the Marine Corps and, in addition, retains the Senate specification of the unit structure of the ground and air elements of the Marine Corps, but it also specifies a floor on the strength of the Marine Corps of not less than 300,000 Regular enlisted men. The committee is convinced that this not only accurately carries out the actual intent of the Senate, but that such a requirement in the proposed bill is absolutely imperative to the accomplishment of its purposes.

American history, recent as well as remote, has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence of a strong force in readiness. Such a force, versatile, fast-moving, and hard-hitting, will constantly have a very powerful impact in relation to minor international disturbances of such types as the Chief of Naval Operations evidently had in mind when, a short time ago, he forecast a "series of small wars." Such a force can prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their incipient stages. Such a ready force, highly mobile, always at a high state of combat readiness, can be in a position to hold a full-scale aggression at bay while the American Nation mobilizes its vast defense machinery.

This concept was soundly presented to the committee by a number of witnesses. Hon. Mike Mansfield explained this urgent need in these words:

In every war engaged in by the United States, Marines have served as a national force in readiness. In the most recent of these wars, Marines in far-flung areas were both the first under attack and first to initiate offensive operations—against the Japanese at Guadalcanal. They were also the first sent to insure the defense of Iceland prior to hostilities. In the event of future conflict, we may expect to see a similar pattern unfold.

In World War I the bulk of the Marine Corps served with the Army; in World War II they served as the landing spearhead for Pacific operations. In World War III they may serve in either, both, or a different capacity, but one fact is etched with clarity: The Marine Corps, because of its readiness to fight, will have a vital role in any future war.

The former Assistant Secretary of Navy, John Nicholas Brown, presented this concept in these words:

I believe history and special training of United States Marine Corps provide the prerequisite for a highly integrated readiness force with which to implement our country's new global responsibilities.

Hon. James P. S. Devereux, the famed Marine Corps general who led the heroic defense of Wake Island at the very outset of the last war, testified as follows on this basic concept involving the present and future need of the Nation for a powerful Marine Corps:

If history teaches us anything, and I think it does, the times cry out for a Marine Corps of sufficient size to meet the requirements which the logic of world events will unerringly place upon it.

I believe it is dangerous, unnatural, and criminal to blind ourselves to the need for highly mobile, superbly trained striking forces capable of devastating retaliatory blows or of preventing attack at all by their posed readiness. Historically, this has been a Marine Corps mission. Historically, it has been performed in the highest traditions of the corps and the country. The missions and roles of the several services certainly place a high priority on the corps to provide this force in readiness. This never has been nor should it be an Army primary mission in all save major actions.

I am personally convinced that two divisions of Marines as part of the Pacific Fleet Marine Force and two as part of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic would not only serve as a major deterrent to any breach of the peace, but as a major tactical weapon in blunting any sudden enemy move for bases or strategic oil or mineral fields.

Should we have this force in readiness, we would not then have to disrupt the lives of our reserves as we did so recently. They would be called in later on if we go into an expanded war. But it is that initial push, that if you have this force in readiness you can call on them and they will be ready to go, and they will be properly trained.

The same issue was also touched on by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Clifton B. Cates, in his testimony to the committee. General Cates advised the committee:

\* \* \* the fundamental part of this proposal is not that the Marine Corps needs four divisions and four air wings but that the country needs the ready forces which the Marine Corps can provide.

Our Nation has a clearly demonstrated need for ready combat forces. This is a need which, in my opinion, will continue for a long time.

The effect of section 1 would be to establish a Marine Corps of such size and organization as to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ready striking force for commitment to campaigns such as that in Korea. These forces would be used to withstand the initial phases of whatever action may confront this country while our vast defense machine regains the required momentum.

The clear need for such forces has been demonstrated beyond question. The capability of the Marine Corps to provide these forces should be fully exploited.

In this general regard, the committee thinks it pertinent to invite attention specifically to that part of section 206 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947—the so-called Unification Act—which very evidently contemplates the foregoing responsibility of the United States Marine Corps, wherein it provides, unlike any comparable language used in respect to any of the other military services, that the Marine Corps “shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.”

Despite the evident validity of the foregoing propositions involving the Marine Corps, events which occurred after the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 have made clearly evident the need to clarify and emphasize the determination of the Congress and the American people that the Marine Corps be maintained at the strength necessary to insure its ability to execute its historic and vital functions. Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the combat strength of the Marine Corps had been reduced to 8 battalions, with 16 squadrons of supporting aircraft. The combat strength of the corps was thus at its lowest ebb in years at a time when the need for a force in readiness was at its greatest. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended—and the committee considers this highly significant—that the Marine Corps be further reduced to 6 battalions and 12 squadrons, even though personnel and equipment were available to maintain more combat forces, and no savings would have resulted from this reduction.

Actually, when the Korean War began, the Marine Corps had been reduced to approximately three half-strength infantry battalions on the west coast of the United States and five such battalions on the east coast.

It is the firm conviction of the committee, in harmony with the testimony cited above, that with two Marine divisions and two Marine air wings in readiness overseas, and two Marine divisions and two Marine air wings at home, each with its supporting forces, the United States would have an incomparable combat force which could take the initial shock of the next outbreak and possibly even deter the initial aggressor from offensive action. And to prevent the recurrence of the unfortunate situation existing in respect to the Marine Corps just prior to June 25, 1950, the committee is further convinced that statutory safeguards must be erected, as contemplated in the proposed bill, which will henceforth insure the maintenance of a Marine force in readiness for the three purposes: (1) Of conducting land operations essential to a naval campaign, (2) capable also of suppressing minor international disturbances, and (3) such other duties as the President may prescribe.

The proposed legislation meets this problem by providing a floor of 300,000 Regular enlisted personnel and specifies further that this strength must be attained within 24 months. The bill, as amended by the committee, provides a peacetime ceiling of 400,000 enlisted personnel on active duty, whether Regular or Reserve, and requires the maintenance of a Regular officer strength of at least 4 percent of the authorized Regular enlisted strength. Pursuant to this legislation, a Marine Corps of adequate strength would be maintained, including 4 Marine divisions of some 22,000 officers and enlisted men each, and 4 Marine air wings of some 12,500 officers and enlisted men each, each wing having 12 combat squadrons.

## OPPOSITION TO SECTION 1 OF THE BILL

The committee received three main objections to the personnel strength features of the proposed bill. This opposition came officially from the Department of Defense from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, and from Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The three main objections were as follows:

1. The strength of the Marine Corps in the future as traditionally in the past, must be geared to the strength of the United States Navy.

2. The forces of the Marine Corps and the organization of those forces should be flexibly determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not by the Congress through the enactment of law.

3. A Marine Corps of the size proposed would be duplicative of and competitive with the Army and Air Force.

The committee readily concedes that the first objection would appear to be valid were Marine Corps functions limited to providing assistance to the Navy in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, protecting naval property, and performing other purely naval functions. That Marine Corps functions are so limited was, in substance, the contention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who appeared before the committee in their role as Chiefs of their military services. This was likewise the view of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is, however, the committee view that one of the most important statutory—and traditional—functions of the Marine Corps has been and still is to perform “any additional duties which the President may direct.”

The campaign in Korea, in which the First Marine Division and the First Marine Air Wing are presently participating, can hardly be considered a naval mission. Practically every war involving the United States has found elements of the Marine Corps performing duties other than naval. Indeed, the first two battalions of Marines raised in this country were raised specifically for service before Boston with General Washington's army.

Many Marine activities in the War of 1812 involved only land fighting; in the 1840's the Marines saw “the halls of Montezuma” while serving with the Army in the War with Mexico; in the early 1900's Marine activities in Central America were repeatedly entirely of a land nature; their participation in the fighting in the Boxer uprising in China in 1900 likewise was of a land nature; certainly when in May of 1917 President Wilson ordered the Fourth Marine Brigade to serve as part of the Army's Second Division in the battles of Belleau Wood, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and Meuse-Argonne, and later in the occupation forces, these can hardly be described as naval missions; nor can the activities of Marine Gen. John A. Lejeune, in commanding for a time the Army's Second Division in France, be called a naval function; nor could the service of Marine aviators in France during the latter part of 1918 be accurately termed a naval activity.

It is difficult to see how the sending of Marines as the initial force to hold Iceland prior to the last war, until relieved by Army troops, could accurately be called a naval mission; how the reinforcing of Corregidor by the Fourth Marine Regiment sent from China just before the war broke out, where the regiment was lost, could be

accurately termed a naval action; and if the actions of the First Marine Division on Guadalcanal, commencing the first American attack of the war on August 7, 1942, can accurately be termed a naval action, then in the same fashion the activities of Army divisions in this area must likewise be so termed. It further is worthy of note that on Mindanao in the Philippines, in the last ground action against the enemy in World War II, Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32 gave close air support to the Twenty-fourth, Thirty-first, and Forty-first Army Divisions—an activity that appears to the committee to be only distantly related (if at all) to exclusively naval activities.

The committee must also call attention to the fact that after VJ-day the V Marine Amphibious Corps was part of the forces sent to occupy the Japanese island of Kyushu, that the III Marine Amphibious Corps was sent to North China to accept the surrender of Japanese troops there, that a Marine division, with other forces, was kept in China until the summer of 1947 during the attempt of the United States to settle the civil war between the Chinese Government and Chinese Communist forces. It is a strained construction indeed of military activities to characterize such employment of the United States Marines as essentially naval in character.

Coming up to date, the committee has the very distinct impression that, immediately after the First Marine Division was committed in Korea, if the Marine Corps had been called upon to perform its so-called primary naval mission, the accomplishment of that mission would have been almost impossible. Forces for that mission simply were unavailable as a result of the demands imposed by other missions of the Marine Corps.

In summary, therefore, it is patently sound to gear to the strength of the Navy the strength of those Marine Corps forces which are assigned to the operating forces of the Navy. But it is patently unsound and insupportable in the view of the committee to gear the strength of the entire Marine Corps to that of the Navy, for throughout American history the Marine Corps has repeatedly served, in effect, as "shock ground troops for the Nation" in the earliest stages of land warfare, has served time and again with the Army throughout the progress of land wars, and is today once again engaged in the same function.

The committee considers it very necessary to point out that the most significant weakness inherent in a percentage relationship of Marine Corps strength to naval strength is that such a relationship unavoidably produces the lowest Marine Corps strength at the very time when a Marine force in readiness is most needed. The need for Marines as a ready force is paramount when the Nation is largely demobilized; it may actually recede after full mobilization. The Nation's ground shock troops must be the most ready when the Nation generally is least ready.

Accordingly, the committee has concluded that the percentage relationship insisted upon by the Defense Department is the very antithesis of the concept of Marine readiness. The committee has rejected it accordingly.

Then there is the second objection, that the forces of the Marine Corps and their organization should be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not by the Congress. The committee considers it only necessary to point out in this regard that the founding fathers,

in framing the Constitution, placed in the Congress the power and duty to provide for and support the military services. The committee conceives it to be the function and prerogative of the Congress to determine the size and composition of the Armed Forces; it is the function of the executive branch to command such forces as are placed at its disposal by the Congress.

The principle involved in this question is, of course, not new. The 70-group bill, enacted by the last Congress, does the type of thing for the Air Force now proposed by the committee for the Marine Corps. Public Law 3 of this Congress minutely specifies the composition of a new naval shipbuilding program. For years the composition of the fleets has been determined by law. The first Army drafts of legislation desired by the Army respecting Army organization, which subject is encompassed also in the so-called 70-group bill, specified for the Army (at its request) its division structure in the same manner that the early drafts of the 70-group bill specified the number of Regular and Reserve groups to be within the Air Force.

Stated simply, it is the view of the Committee on Armed Services that the fact that the Congress has considered it advisable to establish by law the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not intended to and does not constitute an abdication by the Congress of its authority and responsibility in regard to determining the size and character of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The third objection to section 1 of the proposed bill was that the Marine Corps of the proposed size would be duplicative of and competitive with the Army and the Air Force. The National Security Act of 1947 (the Unification Act) provides that it is the responsibility of the Army to prepare land forces for the effective prosecution of war, and that the Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the Air Forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. The purpose of insuring a ready Marine Corps of four combat divisions and four air wings is not to provide either the land forces or the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. Rather, its purpose is to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war. The committee feels that, far from being duplicative or competitive, such a force would better enable the Army and Air Force to concentrate on their major responsibility of preparing for all-out war.

It was pointed out in the committee's hearings on this measure that during World War II, the Marine Corps contained 486,000 men, organized into 6 divisions, a force half again as large as that contemplated in the proposed bill. No charges of duplication or undesirable competition were occasioned by a Marine force of even that size.

It is also of significance that an analysis of the relative strengths of the Marine Corps and the Navy shows a wide variation from the former statutory 20-percent relationship, particularly in time of emergency or war. The law itself, which establishes the percentage relationship, was first enacted only 13 years ago (Public Law 703, 75th Cong.). The purpose of that law was to strengthen the position of the Marine Corps rather than to impose a severe limit upon it. Military necessity has already compelled the suspension of that statute by Public Law 655 of the Eighty-first Congress, so that it is inaccurate

to characterize this percentage relationship as a traditional and historical ratio which should not be modified.

For the foregoing reasons, the committee has not only recommended increasing the size of the Marine Corps and requiring that it consist of no less than four Marine divisions and four Marine air wings, but the proposed bill also repeals the act of April 18, 1946 (now suspended), which requires that the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps shall be 20 percent of the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Navy.

#### JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

As regards that portion of the proposed bill relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the House Committee on Armed Services has been on record for a considerable time. In October of 1949 the committee conducted extensive hearings on questions of unification and strategy. In addition to taking testimony from the civilian and military heads of the services and their assistants, field and fleet commanders were called in, as well as outstanding civilian and veteran military leaders. The ensuing committee Report on Unification and Strategy has been a basic reference in defense planning and legislation since the issuance of the report on March 1, 1950.

In that report the committee stated:

Insofar as national defense planning is concerned, the committee believes that in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 insufficient recognition was given to this basic lack of adequate interservice understanding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure does not contain adequate checks and balances to insure an amalgam of service views as regards strategic matters; as constituted, it can result eventually, and for a continuing period, in the imposition of two-service strategic concepts upon a third service—a process in the early days of unification that could, in the view of the committee, produce ultimately a seriously unbalanced defense program.

It was the further view of the committee that—

The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure as now constituted does not insure at all times adequate consideration for the views of all services. The committee will sponsor legislation \* \* \* to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a member thereof.

The foregoing statements were adopted by unanimous vote of the House Armed Services Committee.

It was the committee's unanimous view in March 1950 that the interests of national security demand that the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be founded upon a broader base. This view has been reaffirmed by the hearings on the proposed bill. The committee believes, as it did in early 1950, that this can best be accomplished by seating the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The admixture of the fresh and independent viewpoint of the Marine Commandant, schooled and experienced in the trielemental warfare of the water's edge, will have the wholly salutary effect of enhancing, broadening, and balancing the vital deliberations of that body.

It no doubt is true that an Army Chief of Staff will have more knowledge and experience concerning purely land operations of a large-scale nature, an Air Force Chief of Staff will have more knowledge and experience concerning air operations encompassing far-flung battlefields, and a Chief of Naval Operations will have more knowl-

edge and experience in purely sea operations. But the committee is of the view that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with broad experience in all three elements, will form a catalyst and bridge the gap of experience and viewpoint which may exist between the other members, thus making a distinct contribution to the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is for this primary reason that the committee recommends that the Commandant of the Marine Corps become a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically, also opposed this feature of the proposed bill. The opposition was based largely on the following grounds:

1. The Marine Corps is already adequately represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. This feature, in effect, gives representation to a specialized component of the Navy. If this is done, then airborne submarine, strategic air, and other highly specialized forces should likewise be represented. The Marine Corps could not long exist as a separate service.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be unwieldy if a fifth member were added.

4. The headquarters of the Marine Corps is not properly staffed to support the Commandant's membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to provide such a staff would be needless duplication.

Although the principal reason for recommending membership of the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not, from the committee's viewpoint, been merely representation of the Marine Corps thereon, the committee endeavored to determine whether the lack of such membership has in the past resulted in inadequate presentation of Marine Corps views in the deliberations of that body. The committee was advised that since the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has been permitted to attend their meetings on only six occasions—all of them occurring, significantly, after the committee voted unanimously in the spring of 1950 to introduce legislation making the Marine Corps Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Inasmuch as the great majority of major policies affecting the services are within the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the committee strongly believes that Marine Corps viewpoints should be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee recognizes that Navy and Marine Corps viewpoints are by no means identical on all of these major issues, nor should they be. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Chief of Naval Operations to present and sponsor two divergent views impartially and effectively. The committee came also to the conclusion that despite the very best intentions of a Chief of Naval Operations, the holder of that office is very unlikely to be fitted by training and experience to speak adequately for an organization which so frequently in our history, as today, has served in nonnaval activities and entirely apart from the forces under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations. The conclusion appears to the committee to be inescapable that adequate representation of the Marine Corps and its valuable viewpoint can only be achieved by seating the Marine Commandant as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The second ground for opposition raised by the Department of Defense was premised unsoundly on the proposition that the Marine Corps is a component part of the Navy. Actually, the United States Marine Corps is and has always been since its inception a separate service, distinct and apart from the United States Army, United States Navy, and United States Air Force. Both the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps are under the cognizance of the Secretary of the Navy, but the committee emphasizes the fact that this has no bearing on the autonomy of either service. Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy for matters under their jurisdiction. The Chief of Naval Operations commands the operating forces of the Navy. These include such Marine forces as may from time to time be assigned thereto by the President or the Secretary of the Navy, but this situation is little different from any unified command which may be established. It does not detract from the fundamental principle that command of the Marine Corps is inherent in the Commandant thereof.

The Marine Corps is not a specialized service—unless combat duty can be considered a specialty among military men. Elements of the Marine Corps are trained and equipped to fight on land, on the sea, and in the air. This appears to the committee to be breadth, not specialization.

Accordingly, the committee has rejected the analogy presented by various witnesses who compared the United States Marine Corps to component parts of other services, such as airborne, submarine, strategic air, and similar forces. It was not without significance that the Chief of Naval Operations indicated no objection to the Marine Corps sitting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff "on matters pertaining to the Marine Corps," and the Army Chief of Staff also found such a provision not highly repugnant, for, he said, the Commandant should of course be consulted on such matters. In itself, this viewpoint constitutes recognition that the Marine Corps Commandant should be represented when matters pertaining to his military service are involved; additionally, it is recognition that the viewpoint of the Commandant would contribute to the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Neither was the committee impressed by the objection that the addition of a fifth member would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff unwieldy. Actually this line of reasoning would seem to tend toward the single national Chief of Staff concept which has been rejected many times by the Congress. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions by making recommendations only, and since the members thereof, by their own testimony, do not vote, it is difficult to conceive how an increase in membership from four to five members will prejudice their deliberations.

The fact that the headquarters of the Marine Corps is not at present properly staffed to support the membership of the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff also did not appear to the committee to be persuasive. The Commandant unequivocally assured the committee that the required reorganization would not be extensive and that the number of additional personnel required would be small. Such a situation appears to the committee to be no more duplicative than the manner in which the present Navy staff duplicates that of the Army,

or the present Army staff duplicates that of the Navy. Accordingly, this objection was rejected by the committee.

The committee feels it necessary to make it clear to the House membership that the bill as passed by the Senate provided simply that the Marine Corps Commandant should have the status of "consultant" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as contrasted to the proposed House bill which would make the Commandant a full member thereof. However, the Senate committee report stated it to be the sense of the Senate and the intent of the legislation as passed by the Senate that the Commandant should attend all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff even though his status would be merely one of a "consultant." There is no indication in the Senate bill as to how it would be determined, or who would determine, that any given matter under discussion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff might affect the Marine Corps to such an extent that the Commandant should join the discussions and if overruled, subsequently exercise the right, contained in the Senate bill, to take the issue to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. Moreover, this right of appeal is not accorded to the present members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee is of the view that protocol and procedures could be simplified, procedural disputes eliminated, and the dignity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff better protected by making the Commandant a regular member, with no more, and no less, right than the other members of this body.

The committee sees no reason to change its unanimous opinion as set out in its Report on Unification and Strategy in March of 1950; namely, that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be a regular member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to add the deliberative value of the accumulated experience of the Marine Corps in joint operations and to increase the efficiency of the Marine Corps by having its Chief present during the planning stages of policies which affect the Marine Corps, as well as the other services.

## COST

The committee includes in this report the following tabulations showing the additional costs to be sustained if the proposed bill is enacted into law:

*Estimated cost of S. 677 (amended)—4 marine divisions, 4 marine air wings*

	Fiscal year 1952 build-up	Fiscal year 1953 build-up	Level-off year
<b>Personnel plan:</b>			
Begin.....	204, 029	310, 412	334, 111
End.....	310, 412	334, 111	334, 111
Average.....	251, 221	323, 671	334, 111
Per capita cost (U. S. Marine Corps appropriations).....	\$7, 331	\$5, 625	\$5, 734
<b>Monetary requirements:</b>			
U. S. Marine Corps appropriations:			
I. Military personnel costs.....	\$608, 017, 000	\$758, 093, 000	\$853, 275, 000
II. Operation and maintenance.....	477, 108, 000	537, 132, 000	537, 132, 000
III. Major procurement and production costs.....	702, 399, 000	471, 087, 000	471, 087, 000
V. Civilian components.....	47, 843, 000	47, 843, 000	47, 843, 000
VI. Research and development.....	6, 280, 000	6, 280, 000	6, 280, 000
VII. Industrial mobilization.....	50, 000	50, 000	50, 000
VIII. Establishment-wide activities.....	40, 000	40, 000	40, 000
Total U. S. Marine Corps appropriations.....	1, 841, 737, 000	1, 820, 530, 000	1, 915, 707, 000
Presently before Congress, Marine Corps appropriations.....	1, 633, 574, 000	-----	-----
Increase for this plan, Marine Corps appropriations.....	208, 163, 000	-----	-----
U. S. Marine Corps estimates of additional funds required in Navy appropriations:			
Bureau of Aeronautics.....	\$221, 629	-----	-----
Presently before Congress.....	174, 357	-----	-----
Total.....	395, 956, 000	268, 489, 000	145, 343, 000
Bureau of Yards and Docks:			
Camp, depot, training and airfields construction.....	\$583, 038	-----	-----
Presently before Congress.....	96, 594	-----	-----
Total.....	679, 632	-----	-----
Construction for authorized allowance of family quarters.....	1 982, 272, 000	(1)	(1)
Total increase for this plan.....	1, 995, 102, 000	-----	-----
Total estimate, all appropriations.....	3, 899, 627, 000	2, 089, 019, 000	2, 061, 050, 000
Presently before Congress:			
Marine Corps appropriations.....	1, 633, 574, 000	-----	-----
Estimated Marine Corps share of—	-----	-----	-----
Bureau of Aeronautics appropriations.....	174, 357, 000	-----	-----
Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations.....	96, 594, 000	-----	-----
Total.....	1, 904, 525, 000	-----	1, 904, 525, 000
Increase in this plan for level off year.....	-----	-----	156, 525, 000

<sup>1</sup> Savings in basic allowance for quarters resulting from construction of family quarters:

During fiscal year 1952.....	\$4, 947, 000
During fiscal year 1953.....	17, 315, 000
During fiscal year 1954.....	32, 075, 000
Recurring during subsequent years.....	39, 576, 000

<sup>2</sup> Completes expansion; maintenance covered above.

The membership of the House will notice the following items of significance in connection with the foregoing tabulation of cost involved in the proposed bill. In the first year of operation under the proposed legislation, there will be an increased cost of almost \$2 billion; however, the committee wishes to emphasize that almost a billion dollars of this amount is indicated in the above tabulation

to be for the construction of family quarters, and this figure was predicated upon the imminent expiration of the so-called Wherry law, under which private industry rather than the Government assumes the cost of such construction. Accordingly, the committee anticipates that this expenditure will be far lower than indicated in the above tabulation, and the total first-year cost should, therefore, be discounted accordingly.

It will also be noted that the large majority of the additional cost to be sustained in the first year of expansion under the proposed bill is for heavy investments in construction and in the procurement of new aircraft. After the first year of expenditures has passed, thereafter the level of expenditure drops markedly, so that it will be noted that in the second year of operation under the proposed expansion, the total expenditures will be at a level of only approximately \$180,000,000 higher than the level of expenditure contemplated in fiscal year 1952.

The committee invites specific attention to the fact revealed by the above tabulations that once the increased strength of the Marine Corps is reached under the proposed bill, the cost of maintaining the Marine Corps at that strength will be at a rate of only approximately \$140,000,000 annually more than the expenditures planned for the Marine Corps and its support in fiscal year 1952.

#### PROPOSENTS OF THE BILL

In the foregoing report the committee has made it evident that the proposed bill is strongly opposed by the topmost civilian and military leaders of the Defense Department, excluding only the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

There was, however, strong testimony in support of the bill. This was received from Congressmen Mansfield and Devereux, and the following Members of Congress submitted statements or briefs strongly supporting the proposed legislation: Senators Douglas and Smathers; Representatives Thompson, Jackson, Chatham, Evins, Hoeven, Ford, Bennett, Lane, Scudder, and Howell. Governor McMath of Arkansas and the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, John Nicholas Brown, submitted telegrams concurring with the objectives of the bill. Mr. Arthur Hanson, attorney at law, testified orally, also submitting briefs and statements in rebuttal to certain portions of the testimony received by the committee and furnishing the committee with the historical and legal background of the coequal service status of the United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy within the Naval Establishment.

The committee also took special note of letters supporting the objectives sought by the bill from the following veterans' organizations: American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Veterans of World War II, Disabled American Veterans, Reserve Officers' Association of the United States, and the Navy League of the United States. The Daughters of the American Revolution also advised the committee of their support of the objectives of the proposed measure. Gen. Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, was the committee's final witness and, speaking frankly of his own views, gave unqualified support to the principle of the legislation and presented detailed testimony supporting the committee amendments.

## CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with clause 2a of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, there is herewith printed in parallel columns the text of the provisions of existing law which would be amended or repealed by this legislation:

## EXISTING LAW

S. 677

ACT OF JULY 26, 1947 (CH. 343, 61 STAT. 501,  
SEC. 206)

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein.

That the first sentence of section 206 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 501) is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy as defined in this section, shall include not less than four full-strength combat divisions, four full-strength air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic thereto. Hereafter the actual enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps shall be not less than three hundred thousand. The total active duty enlisted strength of the Marine Corps shall not be more than four hundred thousand, which number shall constitute the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps: *Provided*, That this limitation shall be suspended during time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. The actual permanent commissioned strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, shall not be less than 4 per centum and not more than 7 per centum of the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps. 'Actual strength,' as used in this subsection, shall be construed to mean the daily average number of personnel in the category concerned during the fiscal year and shall be attained as soon as practicable without impairing the efficiency of the Marine Corps but not later than twenty-four months after the date of enactment of this amendatory Act."

ACT OF JULY 26, 1947 (CH. 343, 61 STAT. 505),  
AS AMENDED

SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff United States Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal

SEC. 2. Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505), as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United

## EXISTING LAW

S. 677

military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."

ACT OF APRIL 18, 1946 (CH. 141, 60 STAT. 92,  
SEC. 2)

(b) Hereafter the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps shall be 20 per centum of the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Navy.

SEC. 3. Section 2 (b) of the Act of April 18, 1946 (60 Stat. 92), is hereby repealed.



